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Abstract
We show that collective bargaining can enhance downstream firms’ buying
power vis-à-vis their suppliers. We consider a model of vertically related markets,
in which an upstream leader faces a competitive fringe of less efficient suppliers
and negotiates with several firms that compete in a downstream market. We allow
downstream firms to join forces in negotiating with suppliers, by creating a buyer
group which selects suppliers on behalf of its members: If the group rejects the up-
stream leader’s offer, then its members turn to the fringe suppliers. Transforming
individual listing decisions into a joint listing decision makes delisting less harm-
ful for a group member; this, in turn enhances the group members’ bargaining
position at the expense of the upstream leader. We also show that this additional
buyer power can have an ambiguous impact on the upstream leader’s incentives
to invest.
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1 Introduction
During the last decades, retailers have increasingly sought to join forces so as to enhance
their buyer power vis-à-vis suppliers. In Europe, the grocery industry has seen the
emergence of large chains of independent supermarkets, such as EDEKA in Germany,1
or Leclerc, Intermarché and Système U in France.2 These chains have often formed
buying alliances. For instance, in 1999 Système U created with Leclerc a buying alliance
called Lucie, before joining in 2006 a European alliance (European Market Distribution)
with another French retail competitor, Casino.3 Similarly, in Finland the two leading
chains of supermarkets, Kesko and Tuko, attempted to merge in 1996.4 In the US,
independent retail grocers, including the Independent Grocers Alliance (IGA) have long
used buyer groups to negotiate with suppliers.5 Other industries have undergone some
consolidation as well. In France, for instance, the pharmaceutical retailing industry
has seen the emergence of several buyer groups (Astera, Giphar, and Giropharm).6 In
the US, Ace Hardware, a cooperative of independent retail hardware stores, has now
around 4,000 member stores. In Spain, the four tobacco processors joined forces in their
negotiations with raw tobacco producers.7
In all these cases, downstream firms have relied on collective bargaining in order to
gain buying power. Two commonly recognized benefits of such collective bargaining are
the associated economies of scale and the ability to make a joint listing decision (or
more precisely, a joint delisting decision, as stressed below). Economies of scale arise for
example from common operational costs.8 The ability to make a joint (de)listing decision
arises when a group of individual downstream firms can commit to a decision that
1EDEKA accounted for around 20-25% of sales in German grocery and daily goods retail markets
in 2007. See Bundeskartellamt (2008), B2-333-07, EDEKA Zentrale AG & Co. KG / Tengelmann
Warenhandelsgesellschaft KG.
2Leclerc, Intermarché and Système U accounted respectively for 17%, 14% and 9% of sales in French
grocery and daily goods retail markets in 2009 (TNS Worldpanel).
3Casino represented 10% of sales in French grocery and daily goods retail markets in 2009 (TNS
Worldpanel).
4Kesko is a chain of independent stores, whereas Tusko has both integrated and independent stores.
The concentration was blocked by the European Commission (Case IV/M.784).
5IGA is the world’s largest voluntary supermarket chain with more than 5,000 member stores.
6Astera, Giphar, and Giropharm represent around 20% of the pharmaceutical retailing industry in
France.
7See COMP/C.38.238/B.2, Raw Tobacco Spain, 20 October 2004, mentioned in RBB Economics
(2007).
8See for instance RBB Economics (2007) at pp. 37-42.
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binds all of its members. In France for instance, Leclerc, a chain of independent, large
hypermarkets, negotiates listing fees with suppliers for their inclusion in the catalogue
from which its members can select which products to carry. The threat of delisting has
been viewed by the profession as an important lever in the negotiations between buyer
groups and their suppliers, and delisting has actually occured over the years. Leclerc
made for instance quite an impression in 2008 when it publicly announced that it was
removing six well-known products from the shelves of its (independent) supermarkets.9
The following year, Leclerc delisted Nutella, the famous hazelnut spread, whereas the
popularDanette desert cream disappeared from Intermarché stores;10 and more recently,
Leclerc barred the products of Lactalis, the leading Frenchmanufacturer of cheese, butter
and other milk products.11 Yet, the impact of such delisting decisions has not been
formally studied; and while the cost savings stemming from scale economies generate
obvious benefits, the impact of joint (de)listing decisions is less clear.
The objective of this paper is to explore how joint delisting decision can affect buyer
groups’ bargaining power, and whether larger buyer groups benefit more from such joint
delisting decisions. We consider a model of vertically related markets with secret con-
tracting à la Hart and Tirole (1990). Upstream, a market leader faces a competitive
fringe of less efficient suppliers; downstream, firms compete and use the suppliers’ input
to produce a homogeneous good. We allow a number of downstream firms to join forces
in negotiating with the upstream leader: They create a buyer group, which selects sup-
pliers on behalf of its members. In our baseline model, we focus on a simple rule that
enables each group member to veto the upstream leader, in which case all group mem-
bers turn to the fringe suppliers; later on, we extend the analysis to situations where a
member has more limited influence on other members’ listing decisions. We show that
joint listing decisions indeed enhance the bargaining position of the group members.
Intuitively, transforming individual delisting decision into a joint boycott makes such a
decision less harmful for a group member, as the other group members will also have to
deal with the alternative, less efficient suppliers. This, in turn, enhances the bargaining
9See the article in Le Figaro, available at http://www.lefigaro.fr/conso/2008/01/31/05007-
20080131ARTFIG00452-leclerc-retire-six-produitsde-ses-rayons.php.
10See Tribune Grande Conso, available at http://www.olivierdauvers.fr/wp-
content/uploads/2010/05/TGC80.jpg.
11See the article from the professional review LSA, available at http://www.lsa-conso.fr/un-
affrontement-commercial-couteux-pour-leclerc-et-lactalis,120449.
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position of each group member, by raising the value of its outside option.12 This better
bargaining position need not necessarily lead to lower prices for consumers, however,
which echoes concerns voiced by antitrust authorities; for example, the European Com-
mission states in its Guidelines: “Cost savings or other efficiencies that only benefit the
parties to the joint purchasing arrangement will not suffice. Cost savings need to be
passed on to consumers.”13
The literature has used various ways to generate size-related discounts. Katz (1987)
and Sheffman and Spiller (1992) model buyer power as downstream firms’ ability to
integrate backwards by paying a fixed cost. Getting larger reduces the average cost
of this alternative option and allows in this way downstream firms to obtain better
prices from the supplier.14 Size may not only increase the value of a downstream firm’s
alternatives but also reduce the suppliers’ alternatives. If the supplier’s cost is convex,
then dealing with a larger downstream firm reduces the (average) avoidable cost that
is at stake, which weakens the seller’s bargaining position; the downstream firm thus
benefits from its larger size (Chipty and Snyder (1999));15 similarly, when the negotiation
breaks down with a large buyer, re-allocating production to the other buyers may be
less valuable (Inderst and Wey (2007)). Inderst and Shaffer (2007) and Dana (2012)
relate instead buyer power to the possibility, for a large buyer, to reduce the number of
suppliers which it deals with.
These approaches focus on “pure” buyer power, in the sense that group members only
interact on the buying side.16 Dobson and Waterson (1997) and von Ungern-Sternberg
(1996) consider instead “full mergers,” in which the downstream firms not only join
forces as buyers, but also eliminate competition between them as sellers. By contrast,
we focus in this paper on the bargaining power that buyer groups confer to firms that
are and remain competitors in the same downstream market. In practice downstream
competition between group members varies accross buyer groups and industries. For
12As pointed out by one referee, the joint purchase decision can thus be seen as preventing the
supplier from engaging in a “divide and conquer” strategy with downstream firms.
13Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functionning of the European
Union to horizontal co-operation agreements (2011/C 11/01), paragraph 219.
14See Inderst and Valletti (2011) and Inderst and Wey (2011) for recent contributions that build on
this insight.
15See Smith and Thanassoulis (2012) and Bedre and Caprice (2011) for recent contributions along
this line.
16That is, while group members may be competing in their respective downstream markets, they are
not competing against each other in the same markets.
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instance, in 2008 the French Competition Authority found that the “Leclerc group has
two or more shops in around a quarter of the 208 customer catchment areas” under
consideration.17 In Germany, the Bundeskartellamt made a similar analysis for EDEKA
in several customer catchment areas.18 In all these situations, several group members
thus often compete in the same downstream market.19 By contrast, in the case of
associations such as Group Purchasing Organizations (GPOs) for hospitals in the US,
we would expect most group members to be active in different geographic markets.20 In
that case, our analysis would only apply to those members that do operate in the same
local market. Likewise, for IGA, the US supermarket chain, the analysis would apply
only where several outlets are present in the same city.
We also study the implications of our analysis for upstream investment incentives.
As in Inderst and Wey (2011), downstream competition tends to induce suppliers to
over-invest in productivity, by reducing downstream firms’ outside options and thus
allowing suppliers to obtain a bigger share of the industry profit. As in their paper, we
also find that buyer groups can exacerbate this over-investment incentive; however, when
a buyer group already involves a large proportion of the downstream firms, increasing
its size further tends to eliminate the above mechanism (indeed, if all downstream firms
join the buyer group, their outside option is no longer affected by the supplier’s own
productivity), which reduces investment incentives. This is in line with the concern,
frequently expressed in policy circles, that suppliers respond to the exercise of buyer
power “by under-investing in innovation and production” (FTC 2001, p.57).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first present our framework (section
2), before showing how joint listing decisions benefit group members when they also
17See French Competition Authority (2010), Opinion 10-A-26, page 22.
The Authority moreover noted that the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index median calculated in the cus-
tomer catchment areas went from 2,800, when calculated at the store level, to 3,500 at the retail chain
level, that is, when aggregating the stores from a same retail chain in a given customer catchment area.
18See Bundeskartellamt (2008), B2-333-07, EDEKA Zentrale AG & Co. KG / Tengelmann Waren-
handelsgesellschaft KG, pages 60 and following, in which some customer catchment areas are studied
in detail.
19Dobson et al. (Dobson Consulting, 1999) provide data on the five firm concentration ratio for
European countries in food retail distribution sector. They show that at national level the average
across member states increases by 10% points to over 60% when it is ajusted for buyer groups (page
78). If group members are, in some cases, in the same local market, as related before (see examples
of Leclerc in France or EDEKA in Germany), local concentration is also higher, when it is ajusted for
buyer groups.
20See the report of Federal Trade Commission (2004) on Health Care.
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compete against each other in the same downstream markets (section 3). Section 4
discusses the robustness of our insights and also considers alternative governance rules,
including public contracting (within the group) and less centralized listing decisions. We
then build on the baseline analysis to study the impact of buyer groups on suppliers’
investment (section 5). Section 6 concludes.
2 A simple framework
We consider two vertically related markets. In the upstream market a leader,  , faces a
constant marginal cost of production , whereas a competitive fringe, ˆ , supplies at cost
ˆ  . In the downstream market  competitors, 1  , transform the input into
a homogenous final good, on a one-to-one basis and at no additional cost. We assume
that the inverse demand for the final good, denoted by  =  (), satisfies the following
regularity conditions:
Assumption 1:  (0)   and, for any  ≥ 0,
 0 ()  0 and  0 () +  00 ()  0
These standard conditions first state that the industry is viable and demand is
strictly decreasing; the last one ensures that downstream equilibria are well-behaved. In
particular, it implies that the profit function
 (;− ) ≡ [ (− + )− ] 
is strictly concave, and that a symmetric Cournot oligopoly, in which all firms face the
same cost , has a unique, symmetric and stable equilibrium,21 in which each firm sells
 (), solution to  =  ¡(− 1)  ; ¢, where
 (−; ) ≡ argmax≥0  (;− )
denotes the standard Cournot best response to rivals’ aggregate quantity −. Dropping
21See Lemma 2 (with  = ) for a formal proof.
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the argument  unless explicitly needed, we will denote by  ≡ ,  ≡  ¡¢,
and Π ≡ ¡ − ¢ the associated aggregate output, price and profit; the per-firm
profit is then:
 ≡ ¡ − ¢  
We will assume that wholesale contracts are secret,22 and thus consider the following
competition game:
• Stage 1: (a)  secretly offers each  a tariff (); (b) Each  secretly accepts
or rejects  ’s offer.
• Stage 2: Each secretly orders a quantity ˆ from the fringe and, if it has accepted
 (), a quantity  from  ; the downstream firms then transform the intermediate
product into final good, observe the total output  and sell their own output at
price  ().
As is well-known,23 secret contracting creates a risk of opportunism: As’s rivals do
not observe neither  ’s offer nor ’s acceptance decision, in their bilateral negotiation
 and  have an incentive to free-ride on downstream rivals’ margins; this, in turn,
prevents  from fully exerting its market power. The extent to which this is the case
depends on how downstream firms interpret unexpected offers; for the sake of exposition,
we will focus here on passive conjectures and thus assume that downstream firms stick to
their equilibrium beliefs.24 A downstream firm, anticipating an aggregate equilibrium
output − from its rivals, is then willing to pay  (− + )  −max  (;− ˆ) for
22If wholesale contracts were public, they would have potential strategic effects. See, Bonanno and
Vickers (1988), Rey and Stiglitz (1988,1995) and Shaffer (1991) for examples, in which they could be
used to dampen downstream competition.
Besides its plausibility, secret contracting allows us to ignore these potential strategic effects and
focus instead purely on bargaining power.
23See the seminal paper from Hart and Tirole (1990), as well as O’Brien and Shaffer (1992) and
McAfee and Schwartz (1994). Rey and Tirole (2007) provides an overview of this literature.
24When downstream firms compete in quantities in a Cournot fashion, as here, passive beliefs corre-
spond to the wary beliefs introduced by McAfee and Schwartz (1994).
This assumption captures the above mentioned risk of opportunism, and makes the analysis partic-
ularly tractable. See Rey and Tirole (2007) for a detailed discussion.
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any quantity , which leads the more efficient supplier,  , to supply  =  (−; ).25
It follows that the resulting equilibrium yields the Cournot outcome:
Proposition 1 Under passive conjectures, the above competition game has a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, in which:
(i) Each  sells the competitive quantity , which it buys from  .
(ii) Each  earns the profit it could obtain by turning instead to the competitive
fringe:
ˆ ≡ max≥0 
¡; (− 1)   ˆ¢ 
Proof. See Hart and Tirole (1990).
3 Buyer group
In order to join forces in their negotiations with  , downstream firms can form a buyer
group. In practice the nature of buyer groups, and thus their governance, varies across
industries and countries. This can affect in particular the extent to which negotiations are
centralized, as well as the amount of information on contract terms that is shared within
the group. For instance, when two leading retail chains such as Système U and Casino in
France join forces within a common buyer group, each group member can be expected
to retain some discretion in its negotiations with suppliers. In these situations, the
buyer group negotiates general purchasing terms and conditions, whereas its members
bilaterally negotiate additional specific, customized terms. By contrast, in the case of
associations such as IGA in the US, which regroups a large number of mostly small and
medium-sized stores, we may expect these stores to take on board the deals negotiated
on their behalf by the association; contract terms are then likely to be more uniform
and shared among group members.
25 finds it profitable to supply each , as it can charge
 ¡− + (−; )¢ (−; )−max  (;− ˆ)
=  (−; ) + max  (;− )−max  (;− ˆ)
  (−; ) 
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For the sake of exposition, and in order to focus on bargaining effects, we will as-
sume here that downstream firms keep negotiating bilaterally, and secretly, with their
suppliers, and only join forces in their listing decisions. That is, contract offers remain
secret, even within the group, but each group member can now veto  ’s offers to the
group; for simplicity, we will assume that in such an event all group members must
turn to the less efficient fringe suppliers for all their needs. This fits well with the first
type of situations mentioned above, where group members negotiate specific terms and
conditions directly with the supplier. In the next section, we discuss the additional
strategic effects that arise when contract offers are observed within the group (or when
group members simply stick to the terms negotiated by the group), and also consider
less drastic veto decisions.
Thus, suppose that  ≤  downstream firms form a buyer group , which modifies
the first stage of the competition game as follows:
• Stage 1a: As before; in particular, each group member only observes the offer it
receives, not the offers made to the other members.
• Stage 1b: Each group member recommends whether to accept or reject  ’s offers
to the group ; these offers are all accepted if members unanimously recommend
doing so, and all rejected otherwise. The other downstream firms decide individ-
ually whether to accept the offer they received. Acceptance decisions are again
private information: Members of the buyer group know whether  ’s offers have
been accepted by the group, but do not observe non-members’ decisions, and these
firms only observe their own decisions.
Members’ outside options are thus the outcome of the following oligopoly game, in
which  group members face a cost ˆ and compete in quantities among themselves,
anticipating that outsiders put on the market a given total quantity :
Lemma 2 Suppose that the  members of the buyer group, facing the same cost ˆ and
anticipating an output level  from firms outside the group, compete in quantities among
themselves; then:
(i) This competition yields a unique, stable equilibrium, in which each group member
sells  =  ( ˆ), satisfying
 ≡  ( + (− 1) ; ˆ)  (1)
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(ii) Furthermore, letting  ( ˆ) ≡ ( ( +  ( ˆ))− ˆ)  ( ˆ) denote the as-
sociated profit for each member, we have:
•  ( ˆ)  0 (and thus  ( ˆ)  0) if and only if  ()  ˆ.
• Whenever  ( ˆ)  0,

 

ˆ  0 and

 

ˆ  0
Proof. See Appendix A.
Obviously, there always exists trivial equilibria in which at least two members reject
the offer, and thus  does not supply group members: As no member is pivotal in that
case, they are all indifferent about their recommendation. However, there also exists an
equilibrium in which  , being more efficient, keeps supplying all firms. Furthermore, in
any such equilibrium,  enters again into bilaterally efficient contracts, which leads it
to supply the competitive quantity  to all firms; the introduction of a buyer group
thus does not affect the equilibrium price and outputs. It however alters the bargaining
power of the group members: By vetoing  ’s offers, they can now secure  ( ˆ) =
 ¡(− )   ˆ¢. This leads to:
Proposition 3 There exists an equilibrium in which  supplies all firms. Furthermore,
under passive conjectures, in any such equilibrium:
(i) All firms sell the competitive quantity .
(ii) Each non-member earns ˆ1 = ˆ, whereas each group member earns
ˆ ≡  ¡(− )   ˆ¢ 
Proof. See Appendix B.
Thus, in equilibrium,  ends up supplying the Cournot quantity to all firms, whether
they belong to the buyer group or not. Forming a buyer group however affects the division
of profits. While non-member firms still earn ˆ, group members earn instead ˆ  ˆ.
Vetoing  ’s offers enhances group members’ outside options: A member which rejects
 ’s offer must again rely on less efficient suppliers, but this situation is not as bad as
before, as now the vetoing firm is not the only one in this position. As a result, group
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members benefit from enhanced bargaining power, and the more so, the bigger the group
:
Proposition 4 ˆ = ˆ1 ≤ ˆ2 ≤  ≤ ˆ  ; furthermore, for   1, ˆ  ˆ−1
whenever ˆ  0 (i.e., whenever  ¡(− ) ¢  ˆ).
Proof. See Appendix C.
As mentioned above, the key intuition here is that, by joining forces in their negoti-
ation with the leading supplier, group members enhance their outside option: Turning
to less efficient suppliers remains costly, but it becomes less painful when the other
members have to do the same. Conversely, alternative decision rules, which do not
necessarily grant veto power to a group member, are less effective in enhancing that
members’ bargaining power, as they do not guarantee that members will be “in good
company” if they reject  ’s offers.26
4 Discussion and extensions
In this section, we first stress that our insights do not depend on the nature of down-
stream competition (subsection 4.1), before discussing our modelling framework and
considering alternative features of buyer groups (subsection 4.2), as well as situations
where group members have more limited influence on each others’ listing decisions (sub-
section 4.3). We then draw the implications of the above analysis for the formation of
buyer groups and discuss the robustness of our insights by considering several additional
extensions (subsection 4.4).
4.1 On the role of downstream competition
We developed our analysis in a context of Cournot downstream competition, where
output decisions are strategic substitutes; similar insights however apply to other types
of downstream competition, such as Bertrand competition with differentiated products,
26For example, if  ’s offers are accepted by the group as long as    members recommend accep-
tance, then there exists equilibria in which  leaves only ˆ to each and every firm, within as well as
without the group (indeed, if  + 1 members recommend acceptance, no member is pivotal, and thus
belonging to the buyer group makes no difference).
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where consumer prices are strategic complements:27 As shown by O’Brien and Shaffer
(1992), secret contracting leads again the upstream supplier to offer non-linear tariffs
with cost-based marginal wholesale prices, so that final prices and quantities are again
“competitive” (that is, the equilibrium outcome is similar to that of an -firm oligopoly
in which all firms face the unit cost ). As above, forming a group does not affect the
behavior of outsiders, but still enhances the bargaining position of insiders. Hence, the
nature of downstream competition does not play a key role when contracts remain secret
among group members (more on this below).
4.2 On the role of buyer groups
The above framework aims at capturing how buyers groups can enhance their members’
bargaining positions in their negotiations with suppliers. The particular modelling choice
— namely, focusing on joint listing decisions, keeping tariff negotiations bilateral and
secret — is in line with some of the examples mentioned above, such as the creation of a
common buyer group by the French retail chains Système U and Casino. It also fits well
with the case of Leclerc, the French chain of independent, large hypermarkets: On the
one hand, as noted in the introduction, the chain has been famous for delisting at times
well-known products; on the other hand, each member retains the ability to negotiate
special deals on a bilateral basis.28 Note in particular that, while we limited the group
to make only listing decisions, the analysis applies as well when the group negotiates
centrally general terms and conditions, or when bilateral contract offers are circulated
within the group, as long as contract terms can be adjusted through secret bilateral
negotiations between  and each group member.29
In other cases, the buyer group may centrally negotiate purchasing terms and con-
ditions, which then readily apply to all members. Such a buyer group still brings the
27See Vives (1999) for a characterization of the conditions under which firms’ decisions are strategic
complements or substitutes, for both Bertrand and Cournot competition.
28In oral hearings, national brand manufacturers have complained that they must grant discounts to
get listed by the group (so-called listing fees), and then negotiate additional discounts with each Leclerc
hypermarket, beyond those already offered to the buyer group.
29Public contracts can have commitment power if renegotiations are constrained, e.g. by agency
problems such as adverse selection between the contracting parties. However, as pointed out by Caillaud
et al. (1995), this is made possible when the parties wish to pre-commit themselves to be more aggressive
than they would otherwise. As here  and the group members wish instead to attenuate the competition
among themselves, public contracts have no bite if secret renegotiations are feasible.
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bargaining benefits emphasized above, by enhancing the outside options of its members.
But in addition, by making contract terms more uniform among group members, which
thus become aware of the terms available to the other members, such a buyer group can
eliminate the opportunism problem among its members; it then has an incentive to act
as a “cartel” and negotiate a contract that de facto eliminates competition among group
members30 — typically making them less aggressive in the downstream market. Contrary
to the case where negotiations remain secret within the group, such buyer groups have
the same effect as a merger; they thus have an impact on the equilibrium outcome, and
hurt consumers.31 They moreover trigger a strategic effect, as outsiders adjust their
behaviour in response to group members being less aggressive. This strategic effect how-
ever depends on the nature of downstream competition: If downstream decisions are
strategic complements, as is often the case with Bertrand competition, forming a buyer
group tends to make outsiders “softer”, thus reinforcing the incentives to join a group;
by contrast, when downstream decisions are strategic substitutes, as is often the case
with Cournot competition, this strategic effect is negative.32
4.3 More limited influence on listing decisions
So far, we have assumed that any member can veto the supplier, with the result that
all group members turn to the competitive fringe; such veto power could for instance
be embedded in the governance charter of the buying group, or result from an implicit
understanding — e.g., through reputation and relational contracting — among group
members. In some cases, however, the opposition of one group member may have a more
limited impact on the relationship between the supplier and the other group members.
We now show that our insights carry over as long as a member has significant influence
30A simple two-part tariff would suffice to achieve this; the wholesale price can be adjusted so as to
induce the appropriate outcome in the downstream market, and the fixed fee — which can be negative,
if needed, as in the case of slotting allowances — can then be used to share the profits as desired.
31For studies of buyer groups that focus on this feature of buyer groups, see Foros and Kind (2008)
and Doyle and Han (2014).
32This, in turn, may deter a firm from joining the group. For example, for a linear demand  () =
1 −  and  = 0, we know that forming a buyer group of two firms is not profitable when ˆ = 0
(see Salant et al., 1983: Mergers are not profitable unless they include almost all firms). Setting-up a
two-firm group is however profitable when ˆ =  ¡(− 1) ¢ = 2 (+ 1): The outside options of the
two firms become positive, which is not the case when they negotiate separately. By continuity, this
remains the case when ˆ is large enough. In this range, forming a two-firm buyer group is profitable,
only because of the bargaining effect highlighted above. We thank Mike Riordan for this point.
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over the other members.33
To see this, let us return to our baseline model with secret contracting, but suppose
now that the rejection by one member induces the other members to drop the supplier
for a share  of their needs.34 This parameter can be interpreted as a proxy for the
influence that an individual member has on the purchasing decisions of the group. For
instance, as leading manufacturers often supply many products, a member may be able
to convince others to drop some of the manufacturers’ products but not all of them (e.g.,
not the manufacturers’ flagship products).
Members’ outside options are thus now the outcome of oligopolistic competition, in
which a member that rejects the supplier’s offer faces a cost ˆ ≡  + ∆, whereas the
other members face a cost  + ∆,  ∈ (0 1) (outsiders still sell an aggregate quantity
 = (− ) ). This oligopolistic competition yields a unique, stable equilibrium, in
which the rejecting member’s output, , again satisfies
 ≡  ( + (− 1) ; +∆) 
whereas each other member’s output, , now satisfies:
 ≡  ¡ + (− 2)  + ; + ∆¢ 
Letting  () and  () denote the resulting outputs, and
ˆ () ≡ £ ¡ + (− 1)  () +  ()¢− (+∆)¤  ()
and
ˆ () ≡ £ ¡ + (− 1)  () +  ()¢− (+ ∆)¤  ()
respectively denote the resulting profits for the rejecting member and the others, we
have  () ≤  () (and thus ˆ () ≤ ˆ ()), because +∆ ≥ + ∆, and  ()  0
(and thus ˆ ()  0) whenever  ( + (− 1)  ())  +∆.
In equilibrium,  ends up supplying again the Cournot quantity to all firms, whether
they belong to the buyer group or not; however, the division of profits differs from the
33We thank the editor, Martin Cripps, for suggesting this extension.
34For simplicity, we assume symmetry in the members’ influence within the purchasing group. The
analysis readily extends to the case where some group members have more influence than others.
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benchmark case ( = 1): The other members still react to the rejection of the supplier
but now face a lower cost than the rejecting member. Hence, if non-member firms
still earn ˆ, group members now earn ˆ (), their outside option in case of refusal. The
formation of a buyer group of size  remains profitable as long as ˆ ()  ˆ1 = ˆ. When
 = 0, the formation of a buyer group is not profitable, as other group members increase
their quantities in reaction to the output reduction of the rejecting member:  (0)  ,
as output decisions are strategic substitutes; group members’ outside options are then
lower than outsiders’ ones. Setting-up a group is however profitable when  ()  ,
as group members’ outside options are then higher. We know that this is indeed the
case for  = 1 and, by continuity, this remains the case when  is large enough. For
example, for a linear demand  () = 1 −  and  = 0, forming a group is profitable
(i.e.,  ()  ) whenever   12.35
Finally, note that forming and/or joining a purchasing group is always profitable,
for any , when downstream decisions are strategic complements; indeed, when one
member turns to the competitive fringe, the other members then react by becoming less
aggressive (e.g., by raising their prices), which benefits the first member — even if the
others stick to the supplier (i.e., even if  = 0).
4.4 Other extensions
Group formation. The analysis of the previous section emphasizes that there is strength
in numbers: Relying on less efficient suppliers becomes less and less costly when other
firms have to do so as well. It follows that joining a group not only benefits the additional
member, but also benefits the existing group members. Hence, in the absence of any
restriction on the size of the group, we would expect all downstream firms to join the
buyer group, thereby maximizing their resulting bargaining benefits.
The analysis is slightly more involved if, in addition to generating these bargaining
benefits, the group also eliminates opportunism among its members, by making con-
tracts public within the group and allowing it to act as a cartel. Joining the group then
makes a firm less aggressive — against the other members, and also against the rivals. If
downstream competition involves strategic complements, then the additional strategic
effects further contribute to encourage firms to join the group. If instead downstream
35We have  = 1+1 and  () = 1−(−)
+∆(1−2)
+1 , leading to  −  () =
¡− 12¢ 2∆+1 .
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competition involves strategic substitutes, then group members become weaker com-
petitors, whereas outsiders become tougher competitors. In the same way that a merger
benefits outsiders more than it benefit insiders, and may even make them worse-off, a
firm may prefer remaining outside the group rather than joining it. Yet, forming a large
enough group would still enhance its members’ outside option, compared with what
they would obtain in the absence of any group (in particular, forming an encompassing
group that includes all downstream firms remains always profitable).
Multiple buyer groups. Also, while for the sake of presentation we focused on a single
buyer group, the analysis applies as well when several (separate) groups are formed: The
members of a group of size  then all earn ˆ. Yet, in the absence of any restriction on
group size, we would still expect the firms to form a single, encompassing buyer group.
Indeed, prospective members benefit more from joining a larger group (0   implies
ˆ0+1 − ˆ  ˆ+1 − ˆ), and any existing group member benefits as well from switching
to a larger group (0 ≥  implies ˆ0+1  ˆ).
Product differentiation. We focused for simplicity on a homogenous final good, but
the analysis applies as well when downstream competitors are differentiated. In this
case, closer competitors benefit more from joining forces in their negotiations with the
leading supplier. As the introduction of a buyer group does not affect the equilibrium
outputs, the key intuition still refers to group members’ outside option: If turning to less
efficient suppliers remains costly, it is less painful when the other members, which have
to do the same, are the ones offering the closest substitutes. To illustrate this point,
suppose for instance that the downstream market consists of a differentiated four-firm
Cournot oligopoly, where 1 and 2 produce the same product (good ), whereas 3
and 4 produce an imperfect substitute (good ). We thus have:
1 = 2 = ˆ ( ) and 3 = 4 = ˆ ( ) 
where  = 1 + 2 and  = 3 + 4. For the sake of exposition, assume further that
the inverse demand ˆ is linear and given by:
ˆ ( ) = 1− − 
where 0 ≤   1. Suppose moreover that  and ˆ satisfy  = 0 and ˆ = ˆ1 (ˆ 0)  0,
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which amounts to ˆ  2
3+2 . With or without a group, all firms sell the competitive quan-
tity  = 1
3+2 . In the absence of any buyer group, each  moreover earns the competi-
tive profit ˆ = ¡ 1
3+2 − ˆ2
¢2
. If1 and3 (producing imperfect substitutes) join forces in
their negotiations with  , then these two firms each secure ˆ13 ≡ ¡ 1
3+2 − ˆ2+
¢2 ≥ ˆ.36
If instead it is 1 and 2 (producing perfect substitutes) that join forces, then these
firms obtain an even larger profit, ˆ12 ≡ ¡ 1
3+2 − ˆ3
¢2  ˆ13. Thus, for any   1, it is
more profitable for 1 and 2 to join forces rather than for 1 and 3 (see Appendix
D).
5 Upstream investment incentives
An often-voiced concern raised by buyer power relates to its impact on suppliers’ in-
centives to invest and innovate. To explore this issue, we now introduce investment
decisions in our baseline framework. More precisely, we add here an additional stage
(stage 0) at the beginning of the competition game, in which the dominant supplier,
 , can invest  in order to reduce its marginal cost , from some initial level   0 to
a lower level  ∈ [0 [. In this extended framework, we study the impact of the size
of the buyer group (established before the beginning of the game) on  ’s equilibrium
investment decision. Introducing explicitly  ’s cost  as an argument in the above-
defined functions, we will denote by  () and  () the individual quantity and profit
in a Cournot equilibrium based on cost , by Π () the corresponding industry profit,
and by ˆ (ˆ ) =  ¡(− )  ()  ˆ¢ the outside option (and equilibrium profit) of a
member of a buyer group of size . Note that, by construction,  (0 ˆ) =  (ˆ) and
ˆ (ˆ ) =  (ˆ); thus, Lemma 2 implies  ()   ()  0 if and only    (0), in
which case    0.
Obviously, it is socially or privately interesting to invest only when this allows  to
be the most effective supplier (i.e.,   ˆ  (0)). The incentives to invest however also
depend on whether the competitive fringe, too, is an effective supplier (ˆ ≷  (0)), as
well as on whether  is initially more efficient than the fringe ( ≷ ˆ). More precisely,
in equilibrium  supplies the downstream firms whenever it is more efficient than the
36For  = 0, 1 and 3 do not benefit from joining forces ¡ˆ13 = ˆ¢, as they do not compete in the
same market.
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fringe, that is, whenever its cost  is lower than ˆ; we will therefore let
Π () ≡ Π (min { ˆ})
denote the industry profit, as a function of  ’s cost , and
∆ = Π ()−Π ()
denote the investment benefit for the industry. Similarly, as a member of a buyer group
of size  obtains a profit equal to ˆ (ˆmin { ˆ}) when  ’s cost is ,  ’s profit can then
be written as
Π () ≡ Π ()− ˆ (ˆmin { ˆ})− (− ) ˆ1 (ˆmin { ˆ}) 
and its incentive to invest is driven by a private benefit equal to
∆ = Π ()−Π () 
When ˆ  , investing does not allow  to become a viable supplier, and thus is
neither privately nor socially desirable. Conversely, when the competitive fringe does
not offer a viable option (i.e., when ˆ ≥  ¡(− )  ()¢), downstream firms obtain
zero profit whether there is a buyer group or not; this leads  to fully internalize the
impact of its investment on the industry profit and thus aligns its incentives with that
of the industry (that is, ∆ = ∆). The same applies when downstream firms form an
encompassing group (i.e.,  = ), as they then earn a profit equal to Π (ˆ), regardless
of  ’s cost; therefore,  fully internalizes again the impact of its on the industry profit,
and ∆ = ∆ .
In all other cases (that is, when    and   ˆ   ¡(− )  ()¢), by investing
 increases its profit not only by lowering its cost, but also possibly by limiting the
value of downstream firms’ outside option, if they were to turn to the fringe suppliers;
indeed, we then have:
∆ −∆ =  [ˆ (ˆmin { ˆ})− ˆ (ˆ )]
+ (− ) £ˆ1 (ˆmin { ˆ})− ˆ1 (ˆ )¤  (2)
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where the terms in brackets are non-negative (and the first one is positive), as ˆ (ˆ )
weakly increases with  (and strictly so for  = ) from  to min { ˆ}. As a result, 
has excessive incentives to invest, compared with what would maximize industry profits
(that is, ∆  ∆):
Proposition 5 ∆ ≥ ∆ for any    ≥ 0, any ˆ ≥ 0 and any  ∈ {1  }; more
precisely:
(i) ∆ = ∆ if ˆ  , ˆ ≥ 
¡
(− )  ()¢, or  = .
(ii) ∆  ∆ if instead    and   ˆ  
¡
(− )  ()¢.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Reducing downstream firms’ rents thus gives  an additional motive for investing
in cost reduction, which tends to increase its incentives to invest, beyond what would
maximize industry profitability. We now show that, while creating or expanding a
buyer group increases downstream firms’ profit at the expense of  , the impact on
 ’s incentives to invest is however ambiguous. For example, when ˆ ≥  ¡ ()¢, the
formation of a buyer group either has no effect (as long as   , because then ˆ (ˆ ) =
ˆ (ˆ ) = 0), or reduces  ’s rent by Π (ˆ), regardless of  ’s cost (if  = ). Thus,
while the creation or the expansion of a buyer group can reduce  ’s rent (if  = ), it
never affects  ’s investment incentives in that case (∆ = ∆ for any  ≤ ). When
instead ˆ   ¡ ()¢, setting-up a large enough group (i.e.,  close enough to ) allows
downstream firms to obtain a positive profit, and expanding it further moreover tends
to make downstream firms’ outside option less sensitive to  ’s cost, at it reduces the
number of downstream firms that rely on  in this alternative scenario, which tends
to eliminate the scope for overinvestment; thus, for  large enough, we expect ∆ to
decrease as  further increases, and eventually converge towards ∆ . When instead
the buyer group is initially small, expanding its size strengthens downstream firms’
weak bargaining position, and may well do so more effectively when  is itself not
too strong; this, in turn, may reinforce  ’s incentives to invest in cost reduction; for
example, if ˆ (ˆ )  ˆ (ˆ ) = 0, then  clearly has an extra incentive to invest when
a buyer group of size  has formed, so as to prevent downstream firms from gaining any
bargaining power, and thus ∆  ∆ . The following Proposition reflects this intuition:
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Proposition 6 For any    ≥ 0 and any   : (1) ∆+1 = ∆ if ˆ ≤  or
ˆ ≥  ¡ ()¢; (2) if instead   ˆ   ¡ ()¢:
(i) ∆+1  ∆ for  large enough.
(ii) However, if ˆ ≥  ¡(− 1)  ()¢, then ∆+1 ≥ ∆ for  not too large, with at
least one strict inequality in that range.
Proof. See Appendix F.1.
Setting-up of expanding a buyer group may thus foster  ’s incentives to invest if
the group is not too large, and tends instead to counterbalance the overinvestment bias,
and reduce investment incentives, when the group is large. To illustrate this proposition,
suppose for example that the costs ˆ   satisfy ˆ    ,  (ˆ)  0, and ˆ1 (ˆ ) =
ˆ1 (ˆ ) = 0. There then exists ¯ and  ≥ ¯ such that ˆ (ˆ )  0 (resp., ˆ (ˆ )  0)
if and only if  ≥ ¯ (resp.,  ≥ ). We then have (Figure 1 provides an illustration for
 = 10,  () = 1 − , ˆ = 07,  = 045, and  = 0; see Appendix F.2 for a detailed
analysis of this case):
• In the range   ¯, ˆ (ˆ ) = ˆ (ˆ ) = 0, and thus ∆ = ∆ .
• In the range ¯ ≤   , ˆ (ˆ ) = 0 but ˆ (ˆ ) is positive and increases with ;
as a result,  has more incentives to invest than what would maximize industry
profits (∆  ∆), and the more so, the larger the buyer group: ∆ increases as
 increases.
• Finally, in the range   , ˆ (ˆ ) and ˆ (ˆ ) are both positive and increasing
in . While ˆ (ˆ ) remains smaller than ˆ (ˆ ) as  increases, it first increases
more slowly, and then more quickly than ˆ (ˆ ) (and the two coincide with  (ˆ)
for  = ); as a result, ∆ first increases and then decreases as  increases (and
finally coincides again with ∆ for  = ).
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Figure 1a: Retailers’ profits (ˆ (ˆ ) — in bold — and ˆ (ˆ ¯))
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
0.0025
s
Figure 1b: Investment incentives (∆)
Implications for group formation. The above analysis shows that forming a group
affects  ’s investment incentives, as well as the value of group members’ outside option.
More precisely: (i) keeping constant the investment level, downstream firms are always
willing to join as large a group as possible, as this enhances their bargaining position,
and thus their equilibrium profit; and (ii) keeping constant the size of the group, the
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value of this outside option decreases as  ’s invests more. As increasing the size of the
group eventually decreases  ’s investment incentives — back to the level (∆) that would
prevail absent a buyer group —, it follows that, in order to maximize the value of their
equilibrium profit, downstream firms still have an incentive to join as large a group as
possible: This minimizes  ’s investment incentives (as ∆ ≤ ∆ for any size ), and
moreover maximizes their bargaining position, given this investment level.
6 Conclusion
While the literature on buyer power has mainly studied the impact of downstream firms’
mergers, in this paper we focus instead on the bargaining power that buyer groups confer
to firms that are and remain competitors in the same downstream market. We show
that, by joining forces in their procurement negotiations, downstream firms can enhance
their bargaining position at the expense of their suppliers. They can do so by creating a
buyer group that selects suppliers on behalf of its members, in which each group member
can veto an offer, in which case all group members must turn to alternative suppliers.
Transforming individual listing decisions into a joint listing decision makes delisting
less harmful, which in turn improves group members’ bargaining position compared to
outsiders.
We show further that, while giving each member veto power on other members’
listing decisions maximizes the bargaining effect of the buyer group, the insights carry
over to less drastic veto power.37
Moreover, while for the sake of presentation we consider a situation where all firms
compete in the same downstream market, the analysis applies as well to “hybrid” buyer
groups, where some members are on separate markets while others compete in the same
market. It is however the presence of competition among group members that enhances
their bargaining position. Thus, prospective members benefit more from joining a group
in which the number of direct competitors is the largest.38
37Formally, when downstream decisions are strategic substitutes, as is the case in the example with
Cournot competition we provide, a group remains profitable as long as each member can influence
the other members’ listing decisions for a significant share of their needs. When instead downstream
decisions are strategic complements, as is often the case with Bertrand competition, the incentives of
forming a buyer group are always positive.
38In the same vein, closer competitors gain more from joining forces in their negotiations with sup-
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We also show that the group’s additional buyer power can have an ambiguous impact
on a supplier’s incentives to invest: Enlarging a buyer group may foster its incentives to
invest if the group is not too large, and tends instead to counterbalance overinvestment
biases, and reduce investment incentives, when the group is already quite large.
Finally, in our baseline model secret contracting implies that contracts are bilaterally
efficient; hence, the enhanced bargaining position conferred by buyer groups does not af-
fect final prices and output levels, and has no impact either on outsiders. When instead
contracts are public within the group, e.g., when purchasing terms are centrally nego-
tiated, the bargaining effects just highlighted are still present, but additional, strategic
effects kick in as well. Forming a group remains profitable if downstream competition
involves strategic complements or else when the group is large enough. In addition,
buyer groups then have an impact on the equilibrium outcome: Consumers face higher
prices and outsiders benefit from the formation of a buyer group. This echoes a concern
often voiced by antitrust authorities, as the cost savings resulting from joint purchasing
arrangements are not necessarily passed on to consumers, and consumer prices may well
increase.
Which of the “public” or “secret” contracting paradigms is more relevant (in terms of
plausible assumptions and/or of predicted outcomes) is likely to varry across industries
or countries. Our analysis provides a framework which can be used to test empirically
these alternative paradigms.
pliers.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 2
The following Lemma will be useful:
Lemma 7 Under Assumption 1, for any  ∈ N∗ and any  and  satisfying  ≥  ≥ 0,
 0 () +  00 ()   0.
Proof. Because  0 ()  0, the expression  0 () +  00 ()  is negative whenever
 00 () ≤ 0; if instead  00 ()  0, then Assumption 1, together with  0 ()  0 and
 ≤ , yields
 0 () +  00 ()  ≤  0 () +  00 ()  0
Assumption 1 ensures that each group member’s profit is strictly concave in its
own quantity: letting  denote the member’s output, − =  +P∈\{} its rivals’
aggregate output and  = − +  the total output, we have
2 (;− ˆ)
2 = 2
0 () +  00 ()   0
where the inequality stems from Lemma 7. Furthermore, the first-order derivative of
the member’s profit is:
 (;− ˆ)

¯¯¯¯
=0
=  ()− ˆ
Therefore, if  () ≤ ˆ, then all group members choose  = 0, in which case  = 
and thus  () ≤ ˆ; conversely, if  () ≤ ˆ, so that  ()  ˆ for any   , each
member necessarily chooses  = 0, which satisfies (1).
When instead  ()  ˆ, each group member must choose a positive quantity   0,
thus satisfying the first-order condition
 () +  0 ()  = ˆ
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If follows that  =  (i.e., all members must choose the same quantity),39 where   0
thus satisfies (1) or, equivalently, the first-order condition
 ( +) +  0 ( +)  = ˆ (3)
Let  ≡ + denote the aggregate equilibrium output. Differentiating (3) with
respect to ˆ  and  yields:

ˆ =
1
(+ 1) 0 () +  00 ()   0

 = −
 0 () +  00 () 
(+ 1) 0 () +  00 ()   0
where the inequalities follow from Lemma 7.
We now turn to . Using  = max  (; + (− 1)  ˆ) and the envelope the-
orem, we have:

ˆ =
 (;− ˆ)
−
¯¯¯¯
==
(− 1) 

ˆ +
 (;− ˆ)
ˆ
¯¯¯¯
==
=  0 ()  (− 1) 

ˆ − 

=
∙
(− 1) 0 ()
(+ 1) 0 () +  00 ()  − 1
¸

= − 2
0 () +  00 () 
(+ 1) 0 () +  00 ()  
  0
39This is a common feature of aggregative games, where one player’s objective depends on others’
decisions only through an aggregator (here, total output) of all individual decisions. See Anderson,
Erkal and Piccinin (2011) for a recent treatment of such games.
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where the inequality follows again from Lemma 7. The envelope theorem yields similarly:

 =
 (;− ˆ)
−
¯¯¯¯
==
µ
1 + (− 1) 


¶
=  0 () 
µ
1 + (− 1) 


¶
=  0 ()  2
0 () +  00 () 
(+ 1) 0 () +  00 ()   0
where the inequality follows again from  0 ()  0 and Lemma 7.
B Proof of Proposition 3
Consider a candidate equilibrium in which: (i)  supplies all firms, which implies that
all group members recommend accepting  ’s offers, and (ii)  6=  (−; ) for some
downstream firm , where − denotes the aggregate equilibrium output of ’s rivals.
’s equilibrium profit, of the form  =  (− +  + ˆ) ( + ˆ) −  − ˆˆ, must
satisfy  ≥ ˆ, where ˆ represents the profit that  can obtain with its relevant
outside option: ˆ = 1 (− ˆ) if  does not belong to the buyer group , whereas
ˆ =  ( ˆ) otherwise, where  denotes the aggregate equilibrium output of firms
outside . Moreover, the constraint  ≥ ˆ must be binding; otherwise,  could deviate
and slightly increase the payment : under passive conjectures,  would still accept
(or, if belonging to, would still recommend acceptance, leading to accept  ’s offers),
and the deviation would thus increase  ’s profit. Therefore, we must have  = ˆ.
Suppose now that  deviates and offers  to supply ˜ =  (−; ) for some total
price ˜. Under passive conjectures,  anticipates its rivals to stick to their equilibrium
outputs, and (other) group members to keep recommending acceptance of  ’s offers to
the group. It follows that, if  accepts the offer, the impact of this deviation on the
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joint profits of  and  is given by:½h
˜ − ˜
i
+max≥0
h
 (− + ˜) (˜ + )− ˜ − ˆ
i¾
− {[ − ] + [ (− +  + ˆ) ( + ˆ)−  − ˆˆ]}
≥
nh
˜ − ˜
i
+
h
 (− + ˜) ˜ − ˜
io
− {[ − ] + [ (− +  + ˆ) ( + ˆ)−  − ˆˆ]}
= ( (− + ˜)− ) ˜ − {( (− +  + ˆ)− ) ( + ˆ)− (ˆ− ) ˆ} 
The last expression is positive, as ( (− + ˜)− ) ˜ = max˜≥0 ( (− + ˜)− ) ˜
and:
• If ˆ = 0, then  + ˆ =  6=  (−; ) implies
( (− +  + ˆ)− ) ( + ˆ)  max˜≥0 ( (− + ˜)− ) ˜
• If ˆ  0, then:
( (− +  + ˆ)− ) ( + ˆ)− (ˆ− ) ˆ  ( (− +  + ˆ)− ) ( + ˆ)
≤ max˜≥0 ( (− + ˜)− ) ˜
Therefore, in both cases the deviating offer increases the joint profit of  and 
if it is accepted; there thus exists a price ˜ that is mutually profitable, i.e., that
gives more than  = ˆ (so that  ’s offer is indeed accepted, either individually
or by the group) and yet increases  ’s profit.
Therefore, any equilibrium in which  supplies all firms, and firms have passive
conjectures, must be such that  =  (−; ) for  = 1  ; this, in turn, implies
 = . It follows that, in any such equilibrium:
• If  does not belong to , it can secure ˆ = ˆ by rejecting  ’s offer.
• If instead  belongs to , it can secure ˆ = ˆ by recommending the rejection
of  ’s offers to the group.
Conversely, suppose that  offers to supply  to each , for a total payment equal
to  ¡¢  − ˆ, where ˆ is defined as above. By construction, a deviating offer that
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is acceptable by  cannot increase the joint bilateral profit of  and ; as  can
secure ˆ by rejecting  ’s offer (or recommending its rejection), such deviation cannot
be profitable for  . Obviously, deviating and not supplying a non-member firm  is
also unprofitable, as it would reduce  ’s profit by
¡ ¡¢− ¢  − ˆ = 1 ¡(− 1)  ; ¢− 1 ¡(− 1)  ; ˆ¢ ≥ 0
Finally, deviating offers that are rejected by the buyer group  cannot be profitable
either, as it would reduce  ’s profit by
 £¡ ¡¢− ¢  − ˆ¤ =  £ ¡(− )  ; ¢−  ¡(− )  ; ˆ¢¤ ≥ 0
C Proof of Proposition 4
By construction, ˆ = 1 ¡(− )  ; ˆ¢ = ˆ1, ˆ =  (0; ˆ) and  =  (0; ); fur-
thermore, the latter is positive from Assumption 1 and Lemma 2, which in turn implies
 =  (0; )  ˆ =  (0; ˆ).
Let ˆ ≡  ¡(− )  ; ˆ¢ denote each group member’s continuation equilibrium
output if the group were to reject  ’s offers. From Assumption 1 and Lemma 2,  =
 ¡(− )  ; ¢  0 and:
 =  ¡(− )  ; ¢  ˆ =  ¡(− )  ; ˆ¢ 
By construction, for   1, we have ˆ−1 = −1 ¡(− + 1)  ; ˆ¢ and:
ˆ = −1 ¡(− )  + ˆ; ˆ¢ 
The conclusion then follows from Lemma 2, which implies that the profit function
 ( ˆ) decreases as the outsiders’ output  increases, and does strictly so as long as
it remains positive, which is the case if and only if  ()  ˆ.
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D Illustration for imperfect substitutes
We study here the differentiated four-firm Cournot oligopoly introduced in section ??,
in which 1 and 2 produce good  whereas 3 and 4 produce good .
In the absence of any buyer group, each  ( = 1 2 3 4) sells the competitive quan-
tity  , which solves
max ˆ
¡ +  2¢  = ¡1− ¡ + ¢− 2¢ 
As this profit is concave,  is thus characterized by the first-order condition:40
0 = 1− ¡ + ¢− 2 − ¯¯= = 1− (3 + 2)  
i.e.,
 = 1
3 + 2 
Furthermore, each  earns the profit it could obtain by turning to the competitive
fringe:
ˆ =
³
ˆ ¡ + ˆ 2¢− ˆ´ ˆ ≡ max ³ˆ ¡ +  2¢− ˆ´ 
where ³
ˆ ¡ +  2¢− ˆ´  = ¡1− (1 + 2)  −  − ˆ¢ ˆ
=
µ
1− 1 + 2
3 + 2 −  − ˆ
¶
ˆ
=
µ
2
3 + 2 −  − ˆ
¶

The profit ˆ is positive when ˆ  2
3+2 , in which case ˆ is determined by the first-order
condition:
2
3 + 2 − ˆ− 2ˆ = 0
i.e.,
ˆ = 1
3 + 2 −
ˆ
2

40In what follows, ˆ1 denotes the partial derivative of ˆ with respect to its first argument.
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leading to
ˆ =
µ
1
3 + 2 −
ˆ
2
¶2

Suppose now that 1 and 2 form a buyer group. Equilibrium quantities remain
the same, and outsiders still earn ˆ, but the group members now each secure:
ˆ12 =
³
ˆ ¡2ˆ12 2¢− ˆ´ ˆ12 ≡ max ³ˆ ¡ˆ12 +  2¢− ˆ´ 
where ³
ˆ ¡ˆ12 +  2¢− ˆ´  = ¡1− ¡ˆ12 + ¢− 2 − ˆ¢ ˆ
=
µ
1− ¡ˆ12 + ¢− 2
3 + 2 − ˆ
¶
ˆ
=
µ
3
3 + 2 −
¡ˆ12 + ¢− ˆ¶ 
The first-order condition yields, for  = ˆ12:
3
3 + 2 − ˆ− 3ˆ
12 = 0
i.e.,
ˆ12 = 1
3 + 2 −
ˆ
3

leading to
ˆ12 =
µ
1
3 + 2 −
ˆ
3
¶2

If instead 1 and 3 form a buyer group, they each gain:
ˆ13 =
³
ˆ ¡ + ˆ13  + ˆ13¢− ˆ´ ˆ13 ≡ max ³ˆ ¡ +   + ˆ13¢− ˆ´ 
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where ³
ˆ ¡ +   + ˆ13¢− ˆ´  = ¡1− ¡ + ¢−  ¡ + ˆ13¢− ˆ¢ ˆ
=
µ
1− 1 + 
3 + 2 −  − ˆ
13 − ˆ
¶
ˆ
=
µ
2 + 
3 + 2 −  − ˆ
13 − ˆ
¶

The first-order condition yields, for  = ˆ13:
2 + 
3 + 2 − (2 + ) ˆ
13 − ˆ = 0
i.e.,
ˆ13 = 1
3 + 2 −
ˆ
2 +  
leading to
ˆ13 =
µ
1
3 + 2 −
ˆ
2 + 
¶2

It is straightforward to check that ˆ12  ˆ13  ˆ.
E Proof of Proposition 5
The following Lemma will be useful:
Lemma 8 For any  ∈ {1 − 1}, and any ˆ  ≥ 0:
ˆ
 (ˆ ) ≥ 0 (4)
with a strict inequality whenever    (0) (i.e.,  ()  0) and ˆ   ¡(− )  ()¢.
Proof. We have:
ˆ
 (ˆ ) =

 ( ˆ)
¯¯¯¯
=(−)()
(− ) 

 () 
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The conclusion then follows from Lemma 2, which ensures that  ( ˆ)
¯¯¯
=(−)()
≥
0, with a strict inequality whenever ˆ   ¡(− )  ()¢, and (when applied to the
case  = 0 and  = )  ≤ 0, with a strict inequality whenever    (0).
We now consider in turn the various cases discussed in the text:
• When ˆ  , investing does not allow  to become a viable supplier, and thus is
neither privately nor socially desirable: ∆ = ∆ = 0.
• When ˆ ≥  ¡(− )  ()¢), the competitive fringe does not offer a viable option:
ˆ (ˆ ) = 0, and thus Π () = Π (), for both  = min { ˆ} and  = min { ˆ};
therefore,  fully internalize the impact of its investment on the industry profit:
∆ = ∆ .
• When  = , downstream firms earn a profit equal to ˆ (ˆ ) = Π (ˆ), regardless
of  ’s cost ; this leads again  to internalize fully the impact of its on the industry
profit: ∆ = ∆ .
Consider now the case where    and   ˆ   ¡(− )  ()¢. Asmin { ˆ} = ,
∆ − ∆ is given by (2), and in addition min { ˆ} =   min { ˆ}. Lemma 8 then
implies that the terms in brackets, ˆ (ˆmin { ˆ}) − ˆ (ˆ ) and ˆ1 (ˆmin { ˆ}) −
ˆ1 (ˆ ), are both non-negative. The first term is moreover positive, because ˆ (ˆ )
¯¯
=min{ˆ} 
0:
• If ˆ ≤ , ˆ (ˆmin { ˆ}) = ˆ (ˆ ˆ) =  (ˆ), and ˆ   ¡(− )  ()¢ (≤  (0))
implies ˆ   (0), which in turn implies  (ˆ)  0 and thus ˆ  ¡ ¡ (ˆ)¢ ¢ ¡(− )  (ˆ)¢;
therefore, from Lemma 8, ˆ (ˆ )
¯¯
=ˆ  0.
• If ˆ  , ˆ (ˆmin { ˆ}) = ˆ (ˆ ); ˆ   ¡(− )  ()¢ then implies  ¡ˆ   ¡(− )  ()¢ ¢ (0), and thus from Lemma 8, ˆ (ˆ )¯¯=  0.
The conclusion follows.
F Upstream investment incentives
F.1 Proof of Proposition 6
Consider first the case ˆ ≥  ¡ ()¢ ¡≥  ¡ ()¢¢.
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• For any   , ˆ (ˆ ) = ˆ (ˆ ) (= 0); therefore:
— If  ()  0, then  ¡ ()¢  ; ˆ ≥  ¡ ()¢ thus implies ˆ    , and
we have: ˆ (ˆmin { ˆ}) (= ˆ (ˆ )) = ˆ (ˆmin { ˆ}) (= ˆ (ˆ )) = 0,
and thus ∆ = ∆ .
— If  () = 0, then ˆ ≥  ¡ ()¢ =  (0) implies that ˆ is never a vi-
able option (even when outsiders are also supplied at ˆ), and thus again
ˆ (ˆmin { ˆ}) = ˆ (ˆmin { ˆ}) = 0, and ∆ = ∆ .
• For  = , we also have ˆ (ˆmin { ˆ}) = ˆ (ˆmin { ˆ}) ¡=  (ˆ)¢, and thus
∆ = ∆ .
Therefore, for any  ∈ {1  }, ∆ = ∆ ; thus, ∆+1 = ∆ for any   . Likewise,
if ˆ ≤ , then ∆ = ∆ = 0 for any  ∈ {1  }, and thus ∆+1 = ∆ for any   .
We now assume   ˆ   ¡ ()¢, and distinguish two cases.
Case 1:   ˆ ≤ . In that case, investing allows  to become an effective supplier,
and
∆ = Π () = Π ()− ˆ (ˆ )− (− ) ˆ1 (ˆ ) 
Therefore, for  ∈ {1  − 1}:
∆+1 −∆ = Π+1 ()−Π ()
= − £ˆ+1 (ˆ )− ˆ (ˆ )¤− £ˆ+1 (ˆ )− ˆ1 (ˆ )¤
≤ 0
where the inequality follows from the fact that downstream firms’ outside option in-
creases with ; this inequality is moreover strict whenever ˆ   ¡(− − 1)  ()¢,
which is the case for  large enough (as ˆ ¡  ¡ ()¢¢   (0)).
Case 2: ( )   ˆ   ¡ ()¢. In that case,  is already an effective supplier
when it faces a cost , and investing allows it to further increase its efficiency; we then
have:
∆ = ∆ + (− )
£ˆ1 (ˆ )− ˆ1 (ˆ )¤+  [ˆ (ˆ )− ˆ (ˆ )] 
From Proposition 5, ∆ = ∆ and ∆ ≥ ∆ for any   , with a strict inequality
when ˆ   ¡(− )  ()¢. Therefore:
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• As ˆ   ¡ ()¢, ∆−1  ∆ = ∆ ; therefore, there exists ¯ ≤  such that
∆−1  ∆ for  ∈ {¯  }.
• If in addition ˆ ≥  ¡(− 1)  ()¢, then ∆ = ∆ for  small enough (namely,
as long as ˆ ≥  ¡(− )  ()¢), whereas ∆  ∆ for  large enough (e.g., for
 = − 1); therefore, there exists  ≥ 1 such that ∆+1 ≥ ∆ , with at least one
strict inequality, for  ∈ {1  }.
F.2 Illustration: linear demand
Suppose that demand is linear:  () = 1−. We then have:
•  () solves
argmax
¡ ¡(− 1) () + ¢− ¢  = ¡1− (− 1)  ()−  − ¢ 
and is thus characterized by the first-order condition
0 =
¡
1− (− 1)  ()−  − ¢ ¯¯= = 1− − (+ 1)  () = 0
i.e.
 () = 1− + 1 
• A member of a group of size  obtains
ˆ =
³
ˆ ¡(− )  + (− 1) ˆ + ˆ¢− ˆ´ ˆ ≡ max ³ˆ ¡(− )  + (− 1) ˆ + ¢− ˆ´ 
where³
ˆ ¡(− )  + (− 1) ˆ + ¢− ˆ´  = ¡1− (− )  − (− 1) ˆ −  − ˆ¢ ˆ
The first-order condition yields, for  = ˆ:
0 = 1− (− )  ()− ˆ − ˆ− ˆ = 1− (− )  ()− (+ 1) ˆ − ˆ
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or
(+ 1) ˆ + (− ) 1− + 1 = 1− ˆ
leading to:
ˆ (ˆ ) = (+ 1)− (+ 1) ˆ+ (− ) 
(+ 1) (+ 1) 
ˆ (ˆ ) =
µ
(+ 1)− (+ 1) ˆ+ (− ) 
(+ 1) (+ 1)
¶2

Therefore, ˆ (ˆ ) and ˆ (ˆ ) are positive if and only if
  ˆ () = (+ 1) ˆ− 1− 
1−  
We then have ¯ = ˆ () and  = ˆ ().
In particular, for  = 10 and ˆ = 07, we have:
ˆ =
∙
(10 + 1) ˆ− 1− 10
(1− )
¸
ˆ=07
=
10− 67
− 1 
Thus, for  = 045 and  = 0: ¯ = £10−67−1 ¤=045 = 4 and  = £10−67−1 ¤=0 = 67, and
ˆ (ˆ ) =
"µ
(+ 1)− (+ 1) ˆ+ (− ) 
(+ 1) (+ 1)
¶2#
=10ˆ=07=045
=
1
121
(055− 22)2
(+ 1)2 
ˆ (ˆ ) =
"µ
(+ 1)− (+ 1) ˆ+ (− ) 
(+ 1) (+ 1)
¶2#
=10ˆ=07=0
=
1
121
(− 67)2
(+ 1)2 
which was used to generate Figure 1.a.
Turning to investment incentives, we have
Π () = ˆ1 ( ) = 10
121
(1− )2 
and thus:
∆ = Π ()−Π () =
∙
10
121
(1− )2
¸
=0
−
∙
10
121
(1− )2
¸
=045
= 57645× 10−2
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Using ∆ = ∆ +  [ˆ (ˆ )− ˆ (ˆ )] leads to:
• For  = 1  4, ˆ (ˆ ) = ˆ (ˆ ) = 0 and thus ∆ = ∆ .
• For  = 5 6, ˆ (ˆ )  ˆ (ˆ ) = 0 and thus  ’s bias is positive:
∆ −∆ = ˆ (ˆ ) =  1121
(055− 22)2
(+ 1)2  0
and increases with .
• For  = 7  9, ˆ (ˆ )  ˆ (ˆ )  0 and thus  ’s bias remains positive:
∆ −∆ =  [ˆ (ˆ )− ˆ (ˆ )] = 
"
1
121
(055− 22)2
(+ 1)2 −
1
121
(− 67)2
(+ 1)2
#
 0
but decreases as  increases, as illustrated by Figure 1.b.
• Finally, for  = 10, ˆ (ˆ ) = ˆ (ˆ )  0, and thus again ∆ = ∆ .
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